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Beyond Pluralism: Foucault's Strategic 
Counter to Heterosexist Categories 
Ladelle McWhorter 
,.......,._ ~ /' ost nonheterosexuals want to be guaranteed civil rights with 
'-../VL out regard to sexual practices; nevertheless, quite often, gay 
and lesbian activists formulate demands in ways that de-emphasize prac-
tice and emphasize identity. For example, instead of saying, "My having 
sex with women is irrelevant to the question of whether I should have 
custody of my child," a lesbian activist might say, "My lesbian identity is 
as moral and healthy as heterosexual identity and therefore should not 
prevent me from having custody of my child." The general claim is that 
lesbian or gay personhood is as good as heterosexual personhood, so 
lesbians and gays should have equal rights; our political system should 
recognize and protect a plurality of identities. There are obvious rea-
sons why demands get articulated as support for identities rather than 
allowance of practices. Many people are much more willing to love the 
"sinner" if they are still allowed to hate the "sin," so gays and lesbians 
have formulated appeals in the ways most likely to be supported by 
heterosexuals. But, when pluralism of this sort is taken as the goal the 
powers supporting heterosexism go unchallenged and are even rein-
forced in some fundamental ways. In other words, pluralism as a politi-
cal ideal may serve to oppress precisely those disprivileged or 
marginalized groups who might be expected to gain most from its 
realization. To make this argument, I will draw on the work of Michel 
Foucault. 
Using Foucault's work in this way is, I think, extremely appropri-
ate. Until his death in 1984, Foucault participated regularly in gay politics 
and theoretical discussion; in fact, virtually all of his work since 1970 
can be read as political moves within gay political movements, as a 
series of contributions to what I will call "gay philosophy." Certainly gay 
politics is not the only background against which to read Foucault's 
work, but doing so can be very interesting and productive, so much so 
261 
262 Beyond Pluralism 
that one might wonder why more people have not approached Foucault's 
texts in this way. 1 
One reason most people have not seen Foucault's work as unfold-
ing within the context of gay politics is that it does not participate in 
the rhetoric of pluralism. Foucault never says gay identity is just as good 
as heterosexual identity. In fact, he registers suspicion of sexual iden-
tities in general and of homosexual identity in particular.2 If gay politics 
centers on the affirmation of gay identity, Foucault seell).s more like an 
enemy than a comrade in struggle. 
There is, however, another interpretation, namely, that Foucault is 
suspicious of sexual identities in general-and therefore of pluralism~· 
because he believes the notion of identity is one of the tools of normal-
izing power, a genus of power of which heterosexism is a species. His 
attempts to undermine the power of identity can be read as an attack 
on heterosexism, an attack begun at least as early as the mid-1970s and 
carried on until his death. What follows is a reading of Foucault's work 
on identity that makes its implications for heterosexism explicit. 
SUSPICIONS OF IDENTITY 
Foucault never says homosexual identity does not exist. What he says is 
that it was invented in 1870 by the psychiatrist Carl Westphal (HSJ, 43). 
Homosexual identity was made possible, he claims, by the transposition 
of the habitual practice of sodomy "onto a kind of interior androgyny, 
a hermaphrodism of the soul" (HSJ, 43). Sodomy-a catch-all term 
meaning "any sexual intercourse held to be abnormal"3-is a kind of 
practice. Anyone can engage in sodomy, and almost everyone has, if we 
can believe Kinsey and Masters and johnson. Homosexuality, however, 
is not a kind of practice, though it is strongly correlated with the ten-
dency to engage in practices of specific kinds. Homosexuality is a way 
of being a self; it is an essential component of a personality; it is an 
identity. 
Foucault's 1975 text Discipline and Punish induces suspicion of the 
notion of individual human identity, that is, of the notion of a true self 
that can be known. There Foucault argues that the identity of any 
individual person, insofar as it can function as an object of knowledge, 
is a site for the anchoring of disciplinary power.4 
"For a long time," Foucault writes, "ordinary individuality-the 
everyday individuality of everybody-remained below the threshold of 
description" (DP, 191). The only persons whose lives were chronicled 
were sovereigns and heroes. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, 
however, things began to change. In hospitals, schools, prisons, armies, 
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and factories, functionaries began keeping detailed records of their 
examinatiOJljS of each individual patient, pupil, inmate, soldier, or la-
borer for various purposes having mostly to do with a desire for greater 
orderliness and utility. As the practices of examination and record-
keeping were standardized, two possibilities emerged: · 
firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable, 
analysable object, not in order to reduce him to "specific" 
features, as did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but 
in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his 
particular evolution, in his own aptitudes ·or abilities, under 
the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, 
the constitution of a comparative system that made possible 
the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of 
groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation 
of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given 
"population." (DP, 190) 
This process of meticulous data collection made possible, on the one 
hand, the establishment of norms and, on the other, the identification 
of individuals insofar as their· behavior or performance deviated from 
those norms. Knowledge gained through these methods-knowledge 
of individuals' abilities and disabilities, for example-might enable 
physicians, teachers, psychiatrists, or supervisors to help their charges 
realize their full potential; certainly, it enabled functionaries to arrange 
the individuals under their control to achieve greater efficiency in pursuit 
of their institutions' goals. Thus the individual, as a being identifiable 
in relation to a set of norms, becomes what Foucault calls "a 'case': a 
case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch 
of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power" (DP, 191). What is 
knowable about each of us, the truth of our individual selves, is the 
history of our particular deviations from established norms. That series 
of deviations, that truth, is how we are identified in a disciplinary soci-
ety; it is our true identity. In potentiality, if not in actuality, each of us 
is a case. And as a case, as a knowable identity, each of us is a target and 
an anchor point for power. . 
Now, one might argue that the "identity" Foucault sees as an an-
chor point for power is not the same thing as the "identity" many gay 
and lesbian activists try to affirm. Affirmation of gay identity surely is 
not simply affirmation of one's deviations from sexual norms. We might 
want to impose or stipulate a distinction here between individuality and 
identity. We might want to say Foucault has aualyzed individuality, while 
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political movements promote the acceptance of particular forms of 
collective identity. 
This distinction deserves careful scrutiny. Is it the case that what 
Foucault critiques in Discipline and Punish is different from what gay 
activists tend to embrace? Is it the case that Foucaultian individuality is 
not the same as gay identity, or at least that we ought to use the two 
words to distinguish two kinds of things? Perhaps so. One's individual-
ity, which is just the set of one's deviations from relevant norms, is 
one's own alone, whereas one's sexual identity is something one shares 
with others.5 If one claims a lesbian identity, one is claiming a kind of 
group membership (abstract though it may be for people who are 
isolated from organized gay communities). What is more important, 
this act of "coming out" typically functions as a rite of passage through 
which one defies society's judgment that homosexual practice is a form 
of deviance and proclaims oneself to be outside heterosexist norms. 
Thus, it seems affirmation of gay identity is a direct assault on normal-
izing power rather than an anchor point for it. 
Unfortunately, that may not be so. Announcing that one's differ-
ence is not deviance need have no effect whatsoever on normalizing 
power-even if the claim is heeded. As long as normalizing thinking 
itself goes unchallenged, the best we can hope for is establishment of a 
parallel set of norms of homosexual identity development, an event 
that would leave normalizing power completely intact and would simply 
make possible the identification of new forms of deviance. This is al-
ready happening to a limited extent. Occasionally, one hears people 
defend homosexuality as, for some individuals at least, normal. 
Normalizing power can simply absorb new identities as hew norms 
against which to measure new types of deviation. Any identity can func-
tion as the name for a type of personhood for which there are known 
or knowable developmental and behavioral norms. And, thus, any iden-
tity can be used to normalize and oppress those who deviate from it.6 
Setting up homosexual identity as just-as-good-as-only-different-from 
heterosexual identity does nothing to challenge the powers that enable 
heterosexist oppression to begin with. 
It is true that the kind of identity many gay and lesbian activists 
affirm is not exactly the individuality that Foucault studies. Individuality 
is the name for a particular person's specific location within a normed 
type, whereas identity is the name for a norm, elevated to a type of 
personhood, that individuals have in common. Identity and individual-
ity are not exactly the same thing; nevertheless, they are intimately 
related. Individuals exist in relation to normed identity types. There-
fore, individuality, the anchor point for power, depends upon the ex-
istence of identity types. This dependency relation is the reason Foucault 
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attempts, particularly in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, to undermine 
identity. lQentity is a tool of normalization, and normalization is the 
source of most of our sexual misery. 
ALTERNATIVE POLITICS: THE GENEALOGY OF 
SEXUAL CATEGORIES 
Identities are tools of power. As such, they are never, under any circum-
stances, completely unproblematic. Given his own analysis, Foucault 
could not affirm the notion that for each of us there exists a true sexual 
identity that we have only to discover and manifest, nor could he accept 
a political imperative to establish a collective identity ori the basis of 
which to demand legal and social change. 
Nevertheless, one is given to oneself as an object of knowledge. 
One stands marked out and identified as a homosexual. One must 
assume that position, whether one wants to or not, in a society that 
imposes that label at sites of specific recurrent desires and practices. 
And in assuming that position one finds that one is oppressed. What 
can one do? 
One might attempt to defend one's desires and practices without 
reifying them. But, while that might be a viable option in some circum-
stances, in the present climate it might be political suicide. Conserva-
tives are trying to force gays and lesbians into just such a defensive 
posture by claiming that homosexuality is a choice of practice, not an 
aspect of personhood, and therefore is punishable. No doubt if the 
terms of the debate shift in the directions conservatives desire, political 
and economic oppression will intensifY and lives will be destroyed. In 
addition, beyond the immediate strategic considerations, one might 
balk at the notion of "defending" one's desires, pr~ctices, lifestyle, or 
whatever anyway. Why assume homosexuality is the issue? Instead of 
defending homosexuality, why not attack the power structures of 
heterosexism outright? 
That, I believe, is what Foucault seeks to do. With his critique of 
normalizing power carefully laid out in Discipline and Punish, he launches 
his direct attack on heterosexism in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1. 
There Foucault makes his argument that homosexual identity and its 
opposite, heterosexual identity, are historical products of power. 
Examining the legal prohibitions against various types of "sexual 
deviance." Foucault finds that prior to the eighteenth century "debauch-
ery (extra-marital relations), adultery, rape, spiritual or carnal incest, 
but also sodomy, or the mutual 'caress'" (HS1, 38) were punishable as 
degrees of violation of marital fidelity. Practices that came to be called 
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"homosexual" were not marked out as separate from the rest. ''What 
was taken into account in the civil and religious jurisdictions alike was 
a general unlawfulness. Doubtless acts 'contrary to nature' were stamped 
as especially abominable, but they were perceived simply as an extreme 
form of acts 'against the law'" (HSJ, 38). 
All acts other than those considered appropriate for and -within 
marriage were lumped together as violations of the Sixth Command-
ment, just more or less heinous. 
Not until the nineteenth century did some of those acts come to 
function as signs of the specific natures, the true identities of the per-
sons who engage in them. The advent of sexual identity occurred with 
the spread of medical and psychiatric power into the-family, the home, 
and the school. Once perversity indicated an identity, every aspect of 
the perverse person's life was subject to scrutiny. Foucault writes, 
The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a 
past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a 
type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet 
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that 
went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexual-
ity. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his 
actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active 
principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it 
was a secret that always gave itself away. (HSJ, 43) 
With this understanding of habitual action and desire as indicative of 
identity, every aspect of a person's life was open to the "lines of pen-
etration" (HSJ, 42) of a disciplinary power whose strategy generally 
included a fragmentation of previous unities and a reordering for 
maximal efficiency and control. 
One conclusion of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, then, is that 
homosexual identity is produced by networks of power and that incite-
ment to discover and confess one's identity is a strategy for inserting 
individuals into a power-knowledge grid. Homosexual identity is not an 
ahistorical essence that comes to inhabit individuals either from birth 
or as a result of childhood t~auma or aberrant physiological develop-
ment; it is a historical category produced within a clinical discipline for 
the purpose of managing human behavior.7 Furthermore, its genesis is 
one with that of the category of heterosexual, the norm against which 
the deviance is measured, but more important for Foucault, the norm 
that requires its other in order to exist at all. For, without the category 
of homosexuality, heterosexuality could not be. Heterosexuals are pre-
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cisely not homosexuals; they are normal. But normality exists only in 
relation to something defined as deviance. 
Fou\ault's target here is not homosexuality. It is heterosexuality. 
It is the power that informs heterosexual identity and sets it up as 
natural, unquestionable, healthy, and right. It is the network of power-
knowledge that, by rigidifYing pleasurable practices into sexual essences, 
compels a majority of people to imagine that they are incapable of 
anything but genitality with members of another sex and superior to 
anyone who might be capable of something else. Foucault's genealogy 
of sexual identities disrupts heterosexist power by making the notion of 
pure or natural heterosexual identity deeply suspect. 
Still, uneasiness about Foucault's project may persist. Homosexual 
identity has served as a ground of countermemory and counterattack. 
What if we accept Foucault's analysis and cease to believe in the natural 
existence of any sexual identities? How will that help us, given the 
current configurations of power? It is hard for most of us to imagine a 
selfhood, much less a politics, without identity as a ground, so it may 
seem that Foucault leaves us with no alternativ~ except disintegration 
both collective and individual-which is obviously unacceptable. In The 
History of Sexuality, Volume 1 all Foucault gives in answer to the question 
of how to animate a postidentity self-awareness and politics is: "the 
rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality 
ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures" (HSJ, 157). It was 
necessary to wait eight years for a better answer than that. 
Foucault's original plan for the History of Sexuality series included 
five more volumes after the first, each devoted to some aspect of the 
configurations of power that produced sexual subjects over the last 
three hundred years. But the project changed. In the introduction to 
The Use of Pleasure Foucault explains, "What I had planned ... was a 
history of the experience of sexuality, where experience is understood 
as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, 
and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture. "8 Problems arose with 
the third correlate, specifically with the question of how to account for 
individuals being led to practice a hermeneutics of desire. A genealogy 
of desire was needed, an account of the centuries-long development of 
the experience of selfhood as desiring subjectivity. This new project led 
Foucault back to Greece and Rome. His puzzle now was "desiring man" 
(UP, 6). 
Genealogical work is disruptive. It shakes foundations, fractures 
unity, and disturbs discursive c~ntinuity; however, it is also often a 
necessary aspect of creative work. In the introduction to The Use of 
Pleasure, Foucault writes, 'There are times in life when the question of 
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knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive 
differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on 
looking and reflecting at all" (UP, 8). Given that assertion, it makes 
sense to read Foucault's genealogy of desire as more than an attempt 
to dislodge established theories of what it means to be a subject; it is 
also an attempt to find different ways to think and live. 
As Foucault cast the history of sexuality project originally, the series 
would have concentrated on delineating the institutions and disciplin-
ary practices that created subjectivities such as "the pervert," the "mas-
turbating child," the "hysterical woman," and the "Malthusian couple." 
Analyses of these forms of subjectivity no doubt would have furthered 
the project of destabilizing sexuality and sexual identities, the founda-
tions of heterosexism, but these analyses would not have provided much 
opportunity to explore ways of thinking and living one's gay practice in 
the absence of the identity of homosexual. The turn to Greece and 
Rome did just that. 
Foucault suggests that every morality comprises two elements: 
"codes of behavior and forms of subjectivation" (UP, 29). In some 
moral systems, the codes predominate; but in others, what takes pre-
cedence is "the practices of the self' (UP, 30). "Here the emphasis is 
on the forms of relations with the self, on the methods and tech-
niques by which [one] works them out, on the exercises by which 
[one] makes of [one]selfan object to be known, and on the practices 
that enable [one] to transform [one's] own mode of being" (UP, 30). 
This latter type of morality is what Foucault encounters in Greco-
Roman antiquity. 
According to Foucault, the Greeks understood desire not prima-
rily as attraction toward what one lacks but as part of a dynamic net-
, . ' 
work that included act and pleasure. Desire arises out of knowledge 
that certain acts bring pleasures of a certain kind; the possibility of 
pleasure lures desire toward act, and act results in pleasure, which 
results, once again, in desire. This network is an energeia (UP, 50). As 
such it ·empowers human being, but it may, because of its very nature 
as force, get out of control. One must, therefore, both .cultivate and 
guard it. The purpose of moral reflection, then, 
was much less to establish a systematic code that would de-
termine the canonical form of sexual acts, trace out the 
boundary of the prohibitions, and assign practices to one 
side or the other of a dividing line, than to work out the 
conditions and modalities of a "use"; that is, to define a style 
for what the Greeks called chresis aphrodision, the use of plea-
sures. (UP, 53) 
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In fact, the form of sexual acts-the sex of one's partner, whether 
indeed q1ere was a partner at all-was not the issue. What mattered was 
the frequency and circumstances under which one made use of plea-
sure to strengthen oneself and take care of one's needs. The goal was 
sophrosyne, moderation, the enhancement of one's strength in the rea-
soned mastery of the dynamic, of desire, pleasure, and act. 
Thus, Foucault shows us a culture in which desires and practices 
otir society labels "sick" and "immoral" were neither and were not even 
distinguished from desires and practices our society considers healthy 
and right. His main purpose was to begin to give a genealogical ac-
count of our own attitudes about sexual practices and our own beliefs 
about sexual identities. But in the process of doing that, he also has 
managed to depict an alternative, and, more important for my thesis, 
an alternative that enables the practices we know as gay in the absence 
of homosexual identity. 
Foucault's work is a form of political activity. While he decidedly 
did not advocate a return to ancient Greece,9 he clearly did advocate 
a turn to an ethics of self-aware forms of subjectivation as opposed to 
~n ethics of the code.10 He envisioned a morality in which those per-
sons affected by the values and standards of a society have "the liberty 
to transform the system. "II "Restrictions have to be within the reach of 
those affected by them so that they at least have the possibility of alter-
ing them."12 He imagined ethics as an art ofliving, an art in which each 
would participate as artist. 13 This turn to ethics as art was, for Foucault, 
directly linked to affirmation~ of gay practice. In an interview just prior 
to publication of The Use of Pleasure Foucault remarked, "One could 
perhaps say there is a 'gay style' or at least that there is an ongoing 
attempt to recreate a certain style of existence, a form of existence or 
art of living, which might be called 'gay.' "14 Thus, Foucault's work 
opep.s the way for, among .other things, affirmation ,af gay ethoi, beau-
tiful gay styles, without insistence on normalizing identity categories, 
and thus his work is a political act in support of the well-being of 
nonheterosexual people. The work also embodies a politico-discursive 
strategy that might replace gay and lesbian identity politics and the call 
for liberal pluralism. 
IDENTITY VS. STYLE 
How are we to live that opening, to move into postidentity self-awareness 
and postidentity politics? First, we must recognize the instability of sexual 
identities~ they simply are not what they claim to be. Undergoing the 
inadequacy of identity categories reduces their power to shape our lives.15 
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Loss of the power of identity will be nothing but loss, however, 
unless some other forces are enabled by it. Destabilization of sexual 
categories is merely destructive unless some . other mode of living is 
imaginable. For Foucault, the decentering of identity occurs along with 
the shift to a language of style. His word style, Foucault notes, 16 is to be 
understood in relation to Nietzsche's comment in The Gay Science. There 
Nietzsche writes, 
One Thing is Needful.-To "give style" to one's character-that 
is a grand and rare art! He who surveys all that his nature 
presents in its strength and in its weakness, and then fashions 
it into an ingenious plan, until everything appears artistic and 
rational, and even the weaknesses enchant the eye-exercises 
that admirable art. 17 
Life becomes not a process of self-discovery but rather a process of self-
transformation. That process both produces and is "style" and is for 
Foucault both individual and collective. 
Perhaps we can understand style more clearly by noti.ng some of 
its limits. First, one cannot create styles ex nihilo without historical 
·grounding. A self, having no essential nature, does not exist apart from 
discursive practice, so one cannot simply abandon the discursive prac-
tice in which one finds oneself. One cannot, for example, simply decide 
one is not homosexual. Stylings elaborate on self-formative practices 
and so may modifY both the practices and the self, but stylings are 
never simply chosen as a Rawlsian subject behind the veil of ignorance 
might choose a set of governmental rules. 
Furthermore, styling is not simply alternative identity production. 
Foucault is not advocating something like the construction of lesbian 
identity advocated by, for example, Barbara Solomon.18 Whereas for 
Solomon the creation of a lesbian life is something like the creation of 
an identity that will take a certain predetermined form and perdure in 
a relatively stable manner, for Foucault as for Nietzsche, "style" never 
means anything like a finished product that one would simply live out 
or display. One does not create a truth of oneself that one subsequently 
comes to inhabit. Style, as a configuration of "will to power," is never 
completely coincident with itself; style is a kind of self-patterning energy. 
What fascinates Foucault, what he advocates and attempts to prac-
tice, is a kind of ongoing "styling" that he calls "gay"-which is, to be 
sure, a child of clinical discourse and normalizing power but which is 
not bound to repeat the past. To be gay, then, is not to have a specific 
identity either congenital, chosen, or socially produced; it is to be 
engaged in a certain kind of cultural, discursive, meaningful activity 
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made possible in part by and to some extent destructive and parodic of 
nineteenth-century sexological discourse. 19 Understood in this sense, 
gay styling is not something yet to be produced; it is already occur-
ring-has been occurring since soon after Westphal did his work. As a 
result of a set of historical forces, self-patterning, dynamic gay cultures 
have formed and are forming-and have passed or are passing away. 
We need posit no ahistorical identity to account for the emergence and 
power of gay styles as political and cultural forces. 
If we want an example of gay style, we need look no further than 
the texts examined here. Foucault's work is a response to. the gay im-
perative to challenge heterosexism, and as such it is an acceptance of 
the invitation to participate in the ongoing creation of gayness, of gay 
style. It is a direct, sustained attack on heterosexism-and thus it sup-
ports gayness-but it is not thereby a simple affirmation of homosexu-
ality. This latter point is extremely significant. Foucault's work, as he 
himself says in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, is askesis, a series 
of exercises designed· to change those who undergo them. Thus his 
work is antithetical to stasis, to the affirmation of anything self-identi-
cal. It is styling, ongoing, changing self-styling; it is Foucault's own self-
styling, his own shaping of himself within gay discourse. Hence my 
assertion that Foucault's work itself is gay; it is an effect of gay style. 
Further, within Foucault's gay styling, his strategic counter to 
heterosexism, "gay" becomes an anti-identity, a name for resistance to 
the finality of definition, a perpetual transgression of sexual categories. 
CONCLUSION 
Foucault once made a remark that this chapter is intended to echo: 
"Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we,are, but to refuse 
what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to 
get rid of this kind of political 'double bind,' which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power structures."20 
Maybe the best course of action nowadays is not to work for the 
political recognition of a plurality of sexual identities but rather to 
bring the entire notion of sexual identity into question. Maybe only by 
doing so will we undermine the normalizing powers that oppress all of 
us together and each of us in his or her own isolated, individual way. 
Political acceptance of a plurality of sexual identities may serve the 
interests of those who will instantiate the new norms perfectly, those 
against whom new deviants will be identified, but it is not likely to 
undermine heterosexist power structures fundamentally because it will 
not undermine heterosexuality as a norm for the majority of the 
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population and it will not prevent the label of deviant from continuing 
to be applied to someone, if not all the same someones who bore it 
before. Our goal should not be to win public acceptance of a plurality 
of sexual identities; it should be to challenge the notion of sexual 
identity per se and heterosexual identity in particular. 
Having shown that Foucault's work calls pluralism into question in 
gay and lesbian politics, I want to conclude with two other, related 
points. First, though on the basis of the foregoing analysis I cannot 
make specific claims about the value of pluralis~ as a political goal in 
other social movements, I do want to suggest that feminists ought to 
consider Foucault's arguments as carefully as lesbians and gays should. 
As plenty oflesbians know, the identity "woman," even when construed 
as equal to "man," serves a normalizing function that oppresses many 
people. Establishment of two parallel but equal norms of gender iden-
tity development does nothing to counter the oppressive power of 
normalizing thinking. Affirming a plurality of genders will not end 
gender oppression. Similar arguments might be made against pluralism 
in other spheres. 
Second, I want to emphasize that I have read Foucault's work in 
the context of gay political and intellectual activity, a context in which 
that work was conceived and written. Reading Foucault against that 
background is both an obvious strategy and a productive one. Too 
often Foucault's writing is extracted from its political context, and as a 
result absurd charges are made. For example, some assert that Foucault's 
work disables political practice, or that it amounts to a quietism that 
preserves the status quo, or that Foucault offers nothing to feminists 
because he avoids questions of gender. Only when we refuse to ac-
knowledge Foucault's philosophy as gay can sucb charges sound even 
remotely plausible. Only when we refuse to acknowledge the political 
force of his work on behalf of himself and others as nonheterosexual 
people does the work seem apolitical-only when we refuse to acknowled{i;j 
the work's political force does it seem apolitical. But is that really a surprising 
outcome? It is time to lay these assertions to rest and to acknowledg~ 
Foucault's political context. It is time for politically concerned intelle~~) 
tuals to pay attention to what Foucault's work is doing and has to sa::j 
Foucault is not the enemy; he is a comrade in struggle. 
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NOTES 
1. One who has is historian Jerrold Seigel, "Avoiding the Subject: A 
Foucaultian Itinerary," journal of the History of Ideas, 51, no. 2 (April-June 1990): 
273-99. Seigel writes, "I believe that there is a hidden level of· homosexual 
reference in many of Foucault's writings, and that bringing it into the open will 
help to clarify certain dimensions of his views about subjectivity; at the same 
time it will allow us to understand the connection between the works for which 
Foucault is famous, from Madness and Civilization through his studies of sexu-
ality, and an earlier phase in his career which has been too little considered but 
which casts his well-known works in a somewhat different light" (275). This 
chapter will not take the same approach as Seigel, but I do recommend his 
article for anyone seriously interested in this issue in Foucault's work. Foucault 
discusses his sexual self-understanding and practice in a variety of publications, 
e.g., "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault and Homosexuality," in Politics, Phi-
losophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, Chapman, Hall, 1988): 286-303; this 
interview originally was published in Salmagundi, 58-59 (Fall 1982-Winter 1983) 
and was entitled "Homosexuality: Sacrilege, Vision, Politics." See also the inter-
view with Charles Ruas at the end of Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: 
The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. Charles Ruas (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1986): 169-86. 
2. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. 
Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978), part 1, chapter 2. 
3. Webster's New World Dictionary, 3rd college ed. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988), 1274. 
4. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Press, 1977), 187-92. Foucault also argues 
through this text that the individual is a product of disciplinary power, but for 
the purposes of this chapter that argument is relatively unimportant. For a 
more extensive examination of the wh?le set of arguments, see my "Self-Over-
coming and the Will to Truth: A Reading of Foucault's Discipline and Punish," 
Praxis International12, no. 4 (January 1993): 341-51. 
5. Actually, none of this is as clear-cut as it might seem. My individuality, 
as the peculiar set of deviations from norms that make up my history, theoreti-
cally could be shared completely by one or mor~ others. If it so happened, then 
social scientists might come up with a name for my particular brand of individu-
ality. However, such an occurrence seems statistically unlikely. It is much more 
274 Beyond Pluralism 
likely that I would share a subset of deviations-sexual, racial, or any number 
of other common traits-with many people, and thus I might be identifiable as 
a member of some group. An identity of this sort-a shared subset of devia-
tions-probably is what sexologists mean by a sexual identity. Whether one sees 
homosexual identity as a shared subset of deViations or as a normed type unto 
itself is really just a matter of one's experimen!-<11 or theoretical focus. 
6. Such norms are being established, tentatively, in certain gay and les-
bian communities (as well as in clinical practice). For evidence, see the discus-
sion of lesbian definitional exclusivity in Shane Phelan, Identity Politics: Lesbian 
Feminism and the Limits of Community (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1989), 69-76. For the difficulties such normalizing produces for some practitio-
ners of "homosexual" behavior, see Tomas Almaguer, "Chicano Men: A Cartog-
raphy of Homosexual Identity and Behavior,': in Differericesvol. 5, no. 2 (Summer, 
1991): 75-100. 
7. Of course this does not mean that homosexual identity must always be 
nothing more than a site for the exercise of disciplinary power. Certainly the 
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ing power that invented it. 
8. Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 4. 
9. See Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of 
Work in Progress," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983), 233. There he refers to the specifics ofGree;k attitudes and mores 
as "disgusting." 
10. In fact, he thought the ethics of the code was dead anyway, and some 
creative work was necessary. "And if I was interested in Antiquity it was because, 
for a whole series of reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of 
rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of 
morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of exist-
ence." See Michel Foucault, "An Aesthetics of Existence," in Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, 49. 
11. Foucault, "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act," 294. 
12. Ibid., 295. 
13. "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one· 
practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault, 
"On the Genealogy of Ethics," 237). 
14. Foucault, "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act," 292. 
15. Foucault writes, "Even on the level of nature, the term homosexuality 
doesn't have much meaning .... It seems to me that it is finally an inadequate 
category. Inadequate, that is, in that we can't really classify behavior on the one 
hand, and the term can't restore a type of experience on the other (ibid.). 
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17. Friedrich Nietzsche, joyful Wisdom, trans. Thomas Common (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960), 223. Most English translations of this 
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Diana Press, 1975), 40. 
19. For one account of the ways in which lesbian identity developed out 
of sexological discourse, see Esther Newton, "The Mythic Mannish Lesbian: 
Radclyffe Hall and the New Woman," in The Lesbian Issue: Essays from Signs, ed. 
Estelle B. Freedman, Barbara Gelpi, Susan L.Johnson, and Kathleen M. Weston 
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